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1. PASSIM
(here and there, Latin)

The brief span of an individual life is misleading. Each one of 
us is as old as the entire biological kingdom, and our blood-
streams are tributaries of the great sea of its total memory. 
The uterine odyssey of the growing foetus recapitulates the 
entire evolutionary past, and its central nervous system is a 
coded time scale, each nexus of neurones and each spinal lev-
el marking a symbolic station, a unit of neuronic time.1
J.G. Ballard The Drowned World
The Drowned World is a book by J.G. Ballard in which time 
seems to have done a trick on nature and turned back to-
wards the Jurassic era, leading to a radically warming cli-
mate and jungle-like flora sprouting up everywhere. In this 
Drowned World the humans still inhabiting it are driven to es-
cape into a diminishing habitat in the Northern Hemisphere. 
It is a strange world, but stranger still, it’s not really a world, 
but rather something creeping on the skins of and within the 
humans embedded in it, leaving psychological effects from 
prehistory on their conscious. It seems like a work of fiction 
1 Ballard 1983, 45
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concerned with ideas more commonly found in object ori-
ented ontology.
PASSIM, as well, is a story of a subject immersed in an envi-
ronment (though I will soon explain why it’s not really an en-
vironment, at least not JUST an environment), this one just 
happens to be an environment of fanvideos, Russian fails, 
music videos, sports events and beheadings: YouTube. It 
is a virtual environment, but it acts like a hyperobject from 
Timothy Morton’s theory. These hyperobjects according to 
Morton are “massively distributed in time and space rela-
tive to humans”2 and, as he describes them, have some very 
special features I will elaborate on one by one in relation to 
YouTube. I  will then go more deeply into what this means to 
the protagonist of the story, and moreover, what it is to exist 
with and within these hyperobjects.
Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) is a brand of philosophy 
that, to simplify things, proposes to humble the anthropo-
centric view of positing human existence above nonhuman, 
and conversely suggests an equal existence for all. In this 
brand of thought, hyperobjects  - borrowing from Timothy 
Morton - are then objects in themselves, but also so spread 
both in space and time that they can only be detected as ef-
fects in other objects, or local manifestations of themselves, 
but never as the whole hyperobject itself. This means these 
objects are always nonlocal, but also viscous, sticking to 
those who interact with them; temporally undulating; phas-
2 Morton, 2013, 1
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ing and interobjective. 
“All objects are caught in the sticky goo of viscosity, because 
they never ontologically exhaust one another even when they 
smack headlong into one another.”3 Hyperobjects seem to be 
viscous in sense of unshakeable nearness. They “haunt my 
social and psychic space with an always-already”4 meaning 
there is no going back after their detection, but rather just a 
realization of them having always been there. Once I’ve ac-
knowledged the existence of the hyperobject, it is already all 
around and in me. 
As I enter YouTube today on my browser, it presents to me 
a portrait of myself: videos seen or perhaps left unfinished, 
subscriptions and what I’d most likely want to see next. 
Moreover, it already exists in my consciousness as well, as 
knowledge of - for example - its categories, functions and 
types of videos born only with it. It, as an object, seems to be 
all over my Internet behavior, but just as well, it seems to ex-
ist always-already in my choices and actions as awareness 
of its existence and effect on me. Just a bit over ten years af-
ter its creation I can no longer think video without it, nor can 
I really imagine my “social space” without it anymore either.
Timothy Morton writes of quantum level true nonlocality: en-
tangled particles have been shown to be able to influence 
each other at arbitrary distances that seem to defy the con-
3 Ibid, 36
4 Ibid, 29
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stant that is the speed of light. Since speed of light is seen 
unbreakable, it would seem that “reality just is nonlocal”5. 
This kind of true nonlocality doesn’t necessarily apply to all 
hyperobjects (any more than it applies to everything), and 
YouTube in this sense isn’t truly nonlocal. Yet the way it af-
fects me and the world always from a distance and never as 
a whole-thing is nonlocality in action.
With some detective work, I could maybe work out the loca-
tions of the Google datacenters providing the very physical 
base for the existence of YouTube, such as the old papermill 
in Hamina, Finland. However, none of these locations would 
really give me the answer to YouTubes actual location. It 
would be impossible to accurately map all the locations 
from where the 400 hours of video uploaded to YouTube 
every minute are coming from, and even if it would somehow 
be conceivable to do this, and to locate all of its users at this 
current moment, I still couldn’t pinpoint the exact location 
of YouTube, not even for that passing moment. Similarly I 
cannot locate YouTube just to its address on my browser 
either, because the Internet has bubbled over to the offline, 
as Hito Steyerl suggests in her Too Much World: Is The Inter-
net Dead on e-flux. According to her “the internet persists 
offline as a mode of life, surveillance, production, and organ-
ization”6, and really, YouTube has viscously integrated itself 
on me and on the offline world so that its existence is now 
definitely nonlocal. 
5 Ibid, 42
6 Steyerl, 2013
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5“Hyperobjects are time-stretched to such a vast extent that 
they become almost impossible to hold in mind.”7 A third 
quality characteristic of hyperobjects is that they are tem-
porally undulating. Again, Morton uses relativity theory to 
show how time shouldn’t really be conceived as “as contain-
er in which objects float”8, but instead rather “an emission 
of objects themselves”9.  “Hyperobjects seem to beckon us 
further into themselves, making us realize that we’re already 
lost inside them”10. So “the ocean of floating temporality and 
spatiality wafts to and fro, “in front of things”: not spatial-
ly in front, but ontologically in front”11, practically meaning 
that hyperobjects sucker me in: as I type youtube.com on 
my web browsers address bar, I soon find myself inside the 
space-time of this video-broadcasting complex.  
Yet “hyperobjects are not forever. What they offer instead 
is very large finitude.”12 Infinity, as Morton writes, is more 
manageable, since it is imaginable and thus “brings to mind 
our cognitive powers”13, but what YouTube offers is approx-
imately 80 000 hours of video uploaded to its servers on a 
daily basis. Should one want to stream all of YouTube linear-
ly, one video at a time, even if all uploads were to stop right 
7 Morton, 2013, 58
8 Ibid, 67
9 Ibid, 67
10 Ibid, 55
11Ibid, 56-57
12 Ibid, 60
13 Ibid, 60
at this moment, one would have to wait around about 30 000 
years to finish14.  Going back about as many years in histo-
ry you would find the first examples of figurative art; even 
the Warner Bros blockbuster from 2008 by the same name 
dares only look back to 10,000 BC.
What really causes this temporal undulation and hyperob-
jects’ nonlocality is that they “occupy a high-dimensional 
phase space that makes them impossible to see as a whole 
on a regular three-dimensional human-scale basis.”15 “A 
phase space is the set of all the possible states of a sys-
tem.” 16This is the reason I only ever detect YouTube when 
ordinarily engaging with it on my laptop.
Finally, hyperobjects are interobjective - or rather all things 
are “interconnected in an interobjective system”17 that Mor-
ton calls “the mesh”. In a 2014 talk by Daniel van der Velden 
of Metahaven, he speaks of possession; possession of us. 
He claims that the age of the Internet is an age of “mas-
sive emotional changes that this structure brings about in 
people.”18 The Internet, or its interfaces, make us, as van der 
Velden says, more dependent on, or addicted, to each other 
by means of the way these interfaces are built. I will not go 
into whether this is good or bad here (and it can be both), but 
the intersubjectivity this suggests, borrowing from Morton, 
14 Turek, 2015
15 Morton, 2013, 70
16 Ibid, 71
17 Ibid, 83
18 van der Velden, 2014,  18.35-18.41
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is rather just a “local, anthropocentric instance of a much 
more widespread phenomenon, namely interobjectivity.”19 
What the hyperobjects do - YouTube, among others - is that 
they wholly dismiss the concept of the World as an environ-
ment or a container. They end the world, because “World as 
the background of events is an objectification of a hyper-
object”20 and the kind of closeness the hyperobjects bring 
eliminates the distance a world suggests replacing it with a 
new kind of intimacy. PASSIM’s protagonist starts off with 
the arrogance of a person encountering a thing, something 
he conceives exists for him, as a platform to project himself 
onto.  He comes to this intersubjective platform and sees it 
as a canal for his own creativity. Bit by bit, though, his stand-
point changes, as he comes across signs of a very different 
existence for YouTube in form of quite physical evidence, 
such as when the seemingly Japanese anime fan cult for 
the Russian prosecutor at Crimea, Natalia Poklonskaya, 
turns out to be, by big part, propaganda ordered from a Viet-
namese DeviantArt artist21. These marks of YouTube on the 
physical and political landscapes of his world give him first 
glimpses of YouTube as the hyperobject that it is, giving him 
humility in this newfound relation that first shows as shock, 
anxiety and a feeling of belittlement.
Hyperobjects seem to make us weak and small, but what the 
19 Morton, 2013, 81
20 Ibid, 100
21 Metahaven, 2015, 156-160
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view they offer really gives “is not a faceless, dehumanized 
abstraction, but a radical encounter with intimacy. -- Hyper-
objects force us into an intimacy with our own death --, with 
others --, and with the future”22. Just as I, or the protagonist 
of PASSIM, find myself in this “shifting set of zones emitted 
by specific objects”23 instead of the world I had gotten used 
to, I also find myself much more in contact with everything, 
which leads to a whole new base for broader ethics in this 
intimacy.
In thinking of how interaction with this newfound closeness 
of the hyperobjects - of YouTube - functions, it is useful to 
think of stigmergy.  Put simply, stigmergy “is the phenome-
non of indirect communication mediated by modifications of 
the environment”24 as Leslie Marsh and Christian Onof write 
in Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition. The term 
originates from 1950’s and was originally used to explain the 
so-called ‘hive mind’ behavior in ants.  In stigmergy, agents, 
none of whom have “global knowledge”, act upon a com-
mon environment in the “cybernetic relationship of agent -> 
environment -> agent -> environment through ongoing and 
mutual modification or conditioning”25.  Most notions about 
stigmergy seem to be conceived just this way, with the envi-
ronment, even when it is recognized as the passer of a mes-
sage, being seen as a passive part of the equation, where it 
22 Morton, 2013, 139
23 Ibid, 141
24 Marsh & Olof, 2007, 1
25 Ibid, 3
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9could be practically totally dismissed if it were not to just 
differentiate between straight face-to-face communication. 
With hyperobjects, though, the environment can’t be seen as 
just that, but should be taken as an active operator like the 
agents. Actually, as it has been argued, it probably should 
not be thought of as an environment (a world) at all. Surely, 
not at least when thinking of PASSIM’s protagonist and You-
Tube, as YouTube throws itself onto him just as he throws 
himself on YouTube in a stigmergic symbiosis.
To broaden up on stigmergy, taking the concept to the hu-
man world, our cognitive capabilities can be wholly under-
stood to be more or less stigmergic. “Each individual contrib-
utes to the evolution of collective knowledge, which in turn 
impacts upon the individual”26, and with all of this human 
intelligence transpiring through the environment, the close-
ness of the hyperobjects, YouTube, and other objects like it 
are really quite inseparable from our cognitions.  Stigmergic 
theory actually seems so similar to hyperobjects that those, 
26 Ibid, 9
agent agentenvironment
too, are quite inseparable: they both have an “environmental 
emphasis”, which brings things like YouTube so close that I 
must accept them with me rather than for me.
10
Documentation of the installation in Kuvan Kevät 2016, 
Exhibition Laboratory
Documentation of the installation in Kuvan Kevät 2016, 
Exhibition Laboratory
Designs for the digital prints ( printed on Decotex)
Screenshots of the video
Screenshots of the video
PASSIM on YouTube, 5.9.2016
2.Makapan 
Valley

Makapansgat pebble is a red jasperite cobble excavated 
from the Makapansgat cave in the larger archeological site 
of Makapan Valley in the Northern Province of South Africa. 
Through natural formation and shaping, mostly by streams 
of water, it has come to have a distinguishing resemblance 
to a human face. It would then seem to have been picked up 
from where it had ended, and carried into the cave in Maka-
pan Valley by Australopithecus africanus for a distance of 
several kilometres at least. There it remained among re-
mains of Australopithecus and other species until being ex-
cavated in 1925 by W. I. Eitzman in 19251.
The remarkable distance the pebble was carried, and the 
fact of being left at a place of dwelling, both give reason 
to assume, even when it’s impossible to know for sure the 
cognitive capabilities of Australopithecus africanus, that 
the faces in the chippings of the stone were recognized and 
given value by the Australopithecus. This would make the 
pebble, at least according to our current knowledge, the first 
example of aesthetic recognition and symbolic thinking in 
the human evolutionary line (much predating the 10.000 
BC).  It might have been a mirror-like moment of recognition 
straight out of 2001: A Space Odyssey, a 1968 film by Stanley 
Kubrick, though there is almost something more striking in 
the pebble’s blank stare than in the film’s monoliths. Quite 
interestingly, when Raymond Dart first described the peb-
ble in 1974 (6 years after the Kubrick film), he assumed the 
face the Australopithecus would have recognized must have 
1 Bednarik, 1998, 4-7
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been upside down from what we would now take it to be, as 
this face has too much of a resemblance to the face of a 
current homo sapiens2. But the supposed upside-down face 
bears a weird resemblance to something very contemporary 
as well: the emoji.
In the times of the emoji, we don’t pick up cobbles from riv-
ers quite so often anymore, but something similar to that 
might exist. I do not mean to mystify technological chainf of 
production any further (they can be quite obscure), but there 
is something in the way biomonitoring devices, such as ac-
tivity trackers, reach the market that resembles the “fluvial 
transport” of the pebble into the hands of Australopithecus. 
My meeting with this type of hardware (in the aisles of elec-
tronics stores) of somewhat unknown origin, yet reflecting 
myself, seems a lot like the Australopithecus’ run in with the 
Makapansgat pebble.
“The design of personal health informatics devices is ground-
ed on the belief that such systems can, through the collec-
tion and presentation of personal information, promote in-
dividuals’ self-awareness and that improved self-awareness 
consequently leads to self-insight, self-control and positive, 
healthy behavioral change”3 as Jaana Parviainen writes in 
her Quantified Bodies in checking loop: Analyzing the choreog-
raphies of biomonitoring and generating big data. “Also known 
2 Ibid, 7
3 Parviainen, 2016, 57
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as self-tracking, self-quantification, or the quantified self”4 
biomonitoring is the moniker for the action of gathering 
quantifiable data of the self and using it for self-improve-
ment.
Thus biomonitoring devices, specifically activity trackers, 
but most of the so-called smartphones as well, are active 
body- and behavior-shaping objects. Parviainen uses the 
term embodied practices in describing a choreographic the-
ory on “how bodies develop new habits and routines to blend 
in with the function of technologies.”5 Her main concern is 
the so-called “checking loop” that mobile phones and wear-
able media (and software like YouTube) force on the user as 
a “microlevel choreography” that then leads the users to ig-
nore their “their feelings and sensations on body topography 
and other people within their kinesphere”6.  She argues that 
“embodied agency and free will become increasingly medi-
ated by algorithms in a manner where actions are no longer 
intentional”7. Self-collected data of wearable technology is 
usually seen as neutral and associated with health, but does 
neutrality actually exist in these data mining and analyzing 
algorithms, and to what extent, as it is clear that they will 
feed (and loop) a certain behavior, be it whatever - checking 
loops, drinking intervals or just running and running. 
4 Ibid, 57
5 Ibid, 62
6 Ibid, 65
7 Ibid, 66
21
Josh Scannell asks the same question in his text, What can 
an algorithm do?, in the DIS Big Data –issue. It is not a tech-
nical question, as he says, because “an algorithm is a se-
ries of instructions; asking what one “can do” in any gen-
eral sense is rank absurdity”8.  So what an algorithm can 
do? should be seen as a political and aesthetic question, 
rather than a technical one. “I consider the algorithm as a 
political object, as an assemblage of forces that imprints 
itself on the social as something like “algorithmic govern-
ance.” Intrinsic to the design of an “algorthim” are decisions 
that, when routed through the technocratic administration 
of computation, transform from ideological commitments 
into material accounting.” “Clearly, then, when speaking of 
“the algorithm,” we are not speaking of algorithms per se, 
but rather of a shift in governmentality catalyzed by data 
analytics technologies.” So, to put it in other words: an algo-
rithm can be or do almost anything, and just technologically 
speaking, it can not truly be defined in terms of its opera-
tional abilities (much more than whether the calculus works 
or not). Instead, what should be looked at is the administra-
tional decisions preceding the algorithm. There are sever-
al reasons for this, but most importantly  “the  “algorithms” 
are material and real social processes” and secondly “at the 
same time that “the algorithm” actively mobilizes concrete 
social relations, it occludes these relations by reformatting 
what qualifies as the social. In its technocratic utopianism, 
data analytics systems render multidimensional processes 
8 Scannell, 2015 (all following quotations from ibid until mentioned 
otherwise)
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into numbers subject to mining, dependent upon a logic of 
smoothness in order to function.”
Scannell uses Microsoft’s Domain Awareness System, a 
“crime prediction platform” built for NYPD, in operation 
since 2012, but the same reasoning can be applied to how 
algorithms function in biomonitoring. He writes:” predictive 
crime software has nothing to do with preventing crime. In-
stead, it simultaneously treats public order clinically, in the 
vein of disease prevention or weather prediction (whose al-
gorithms form the basis of much of today’s crime predic-
tion software) and legitimates plantation neoliberalism and 
heterosexist ideology as the base-line measurement of what 
a city should be.” And “when we consider the overall calcu-
lus of what constitutes “crime,” however, the overwhelming 
majority of criminal acts are the sorts of property and quali-
ty-of-life violations that are essentially at the definitional dis-
cretion of the police officer to produce. In other words, crime 
does not exist without the police.” DAS is built and marketed 
as ”predictive crime software”, but it only really enhances 
prejudices already built in the system. The trouble is that 
it makes enforcing dominant ideologies on the population 
more invisible by camouflaging them in seemingly neutral 
number crunching, which stands in contrast to, for example, 
the  much more blatant Broken Windows policy. 
When it comes to the algorithmic performance in digital bi-
omonitoring devices, the same rules apply. It’s an industry 
where “companies and governments often promote the il-
23
lusion that algorithmic processes and data-driven systems 
have been purged of human bias, errors and interference, 
leading to more neutral, objective and automated deci-
sions.”9 “Activity trackers and wearables are seen as power-
ful self-motivational tools”10, but rather than neutral health 
appliances, they are, like hyperobjects, active reality shap-
ers. Parviainen references Bruno Latours actor-network 
theory in suggesting that bodies “do not just participate in 
these networks” (of bodies and collections of measuring 
devices in this case), but are “actively shaped by them, de-
veloping new habituation and embodied practices.”11 We are 
possessed not just by others and by YouTube, but by our 
trendiest wearables as well. 
So how neutral can these reality-forming objects be? They 
have the same algorithmic functioning base as DAS, mean-
ing that this is, again, a question of ideology and politics, 
rather than technology. They don’t really come to our reach 
in rivers after thousands of years of corrosion, but are in-
stead made by a huge and constantly growing industry. It 
is an industry run from start-ups and by Pi Valley and has 
links or affiliations with transhumanist ideologies. It is an 
industry which seems to promote healthy choices, but this 
definition of health isn’t the neutral, abstract term it sounds 
like, but rather, based on the (body)ideals dominant in the in-
dustry. Similarly to DAS, these ideals are mostly white, hete-
9 Parviainen, 2016, 66
10 Ibid, 67
11 Ibid, 67
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ro, cisgender and wealthy. Moreover, even on an individual 
level, the checking loop is only the smallest - and probably 
most harmless - of loops the wearables enforce on the user. 
The wearable technology gives quite simple, but body- and 
persona-forming, guidance that can quickly turn repetitive, 
leading to their own ideology realizing loops - and my anima-
tions hero runs on forever. 
It is almost as in the early cartoon worlds, where most ordi-
nary home appliances and objects of all sorts come to life. 
In the Japanese animated film Ghost in the Shell from 1995, 
an AI unit showcases signs of a soul. It seems appropriately 
descriptive to imagine a kind of a spirit habiting the biomon-
itoring devices as well, a malevolent spirit as such, even if 
only by accident. Malevolent because it has no other chance, 
as it is forced to just execute its own algorithmic nature. For 
the complying user, it means a shrinking experience of the 
world until the algorithmic ideals are reached.  
On a social aspect “when more and more people are involved 
in the checking loop as part of their everyday microchoreog-
raphy, it becomes gradually a commonplace behavior that 
turns into a powerful norm to follow.”12 The whole paragraph 
Parviainen has on this move from individual to the social is 
worth quoting: “For instance, as Thomaz -- suspected, “This 
emerging type of self-tracking data has become the basis of 
a participatory health movement where the axis of respon-
sibility in healthcare shifts more towards individuals and 
12 Ibid, 68
away from institutions.” This implies that people should take 
a much larger responsibility for their own health -- In this 
new landscape, self-tracking would become the norm, and 
people would be responsible for monitoring any symptoms 
of diabetes or cancer in their physical bodies. These types of 
reward-and-sanction systems can be developed to sustain 
the self-governance of individuals. Constructing profiles of 
individuals and groups in terms of their physical conditions 
could be used intentionally to diminish a person’s range of 
future options and to allow or disallow a person to act in 
a certain way.”13 As argued before, this is not just a shift in 
health politics, but is really about who governs the ideals on 
our bodies in the social sphere. 
Moreover, Julian Assange in Hans Ulrich Obrist’s In conver-
sation with Julian Assange talks of three different histories: 
first being knowledge where “its creation is subsidized, and 
its maintenance is subsidized by an industry or lobby: things 
like how to build a pump that pumps water--“14 (second type 
being knowledge in process of being forgotten, and third 
knowledge that some actively try to prevent from becoming 
public). Biomonitoring technology is working in the domains 
of knowledge usually maintained by the health industry. 
There’s a corollary here to stigmergy as well, a downside of 
it actually, as Marsh and Onof write:” it is not so much the 
distributed nature of knowledge that is cause for concern, 
but the stigmergic aspect of enabling technologies that has 
13 Ibid, 68
14 Obrist, 2011
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corroded traditional notions of intellectual authority.”15 They 
write of “expert opinion” facing “a barrage of skepticism” on 
the Internet, but the self-tracking culture has the risk of do-
ing the same on health values.
Hito Steyrl has an article A Sea of Data: Apophenia and Pat-
tern (Mis-)Recognition (e-flux journal #72) that uses apophe-
nia, “the perception of patterns within random data”16 (more 
commonly known as the human tendency to see faces or 
other forms in “noise”), to describe the algorithmic withdraw-
al of data patterns from sources, be it surveillance images 
or data gathered by wearables. The thing with apophenia is, 
it is often equals to overinterpretation of the source, as “pro-
jections” really, like Steyerl writes.  Wearable technology, in 
practice, gives projections of its programming as well, pro-
jections of the governing ideals on how their users’ bodies 
should be and act. 
Makapan Valley reimagines the finding place of the Maka-
pansgat Pebble filled instead with clean white high-rises 
forming a gated community and the former archaeological 
caves repurposed as datacenters humming away with rows 
of server racks making up the backbone of this communi-
ty tied together by self-tracking. It imagines a community 
formed by strong algorithmic biases on perfect bodies be-
coming the social norm that has everyone living the same 
experienced world of the wearable technology.
15 Marsh & Olof, 2007, 5
16 Steyerl, 2016
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“While today statisticians and other experts routinely ac-
knowledge that their findings are mostly probabilistic pro-
jections, policymakers of all sorts conveniently ignore this 
message. In practice you become coextensive with the da-
ta-constellation you project. Social scores of all different 
kinds—credit scores, academic scores, threat scores—as 
well as commercial and military pattern-of-life observations 
impact the real lives of real people, both reformatting and 
radicalizing social hierarchies by ranking, filtering, and clas-
sifying.”17 The Makapan Valley community’s obsession with 
biomonitoring tech is a problem with the policymaking that 
fails to recognize the projecting nature of the technology, 
leading to a society with strict formats on proper, or permit-
ted, living.
It is a form of “solutionism”, as Metahaven writes. “Solu-
tionism takes problems from social and political domains 
and recalibrates them as issues to be dealt with by technol-
ogy alone.”18 This solutionism easily “hijacks”, for example, 
health policies by making them seem like equations solva-
ble by technology. Yet, as it has been shown, the technology 
doesn’t precede politics, but is rather immersed in it, and to 
avoid this kind of thinking, political choices and awareness 
are necessary. On a user level “once one accepts that the 
patterns derived from machinic sensing are not the same 
as reality, information definitely becomes available with a 
17 Ibid
18 Metahaven, 2013
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certain degree of veracity.”19 Biomonitoring tech can truly be 
transformative and a strong motivational tool - and is also 
bringing about innovations that positively move forward 
health industry - but both on individual and social
level, it has monster-like tendencies that creep up unwanted 
changes, which require a very conscious usage.
19 Steyerl, 2016
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video 1
prints
video 4
video 3
video 2
Makapan Valley in Exhibition Laboratory Project Room
Video 1 on 50’’ 4k screen 
Videos 2, 3 & 4 on three separate 40’’ screens 
Two digital prints on Decotex
30
Documentation of Makapan Valley’s installment in Exhibition 
Laboratory Project Room
Documentation of Makapan Valley’s installment in Exhibition 
Laboratory Project Room
Documentation of Makapan Valley’s installment in Exhibition 
Laboratory Project Room
Screenshots of video 1
Screenshots of video 1
Screenshots of video 2
Screenshots of video 2
Screenshots of videos 3 & 4
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